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Abstract
We study monetary policy at the ZLB in a traceable three–period model, in which price–
level targeting emerges endogenously in the welfare function. We characterize optimal price–
level forward guidance under discretion and commitment. Potentially non–monotonic dis-
cretionary welfare losses are lowest with perfectly flexible prices. Price–level targeting in-
troduces a new constraint on optimal forward guidance that restricts the credible amount
of overshooting. With this constraint, the zero lower bound may be binding even after the
shock has abated. We characterize conditions when the commitment to hold nominal rates
at zero for an extended period is optimal. Finally, we introduce government spending and
show that under persistently low policy rates optimal government spending becomes more
front–loaded, while procyclical austerity fares worse than discretionary government spending.
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With policy rates at close to zero worldwide, central banks in the USA, England, Japan and the
Euro Area increasingly resorted to forward guidance (signaling their intention to keep interest
rates low for an extended period) as a tool to lower the real rate of interest and to stimulate real
activity even when the nominal rate is stuck at the zero lower bound (ZLB). Current central
bank policy has been strongly influenced by recent research on optimal policy at the ZLB in
New Keynesian models (e.g. Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003; Eggertsson, 2011; Werning, 2012).
These models allow analyzing the impact of price stickiness, but they focus almost exclusively
on the special case of a Calvo (1983) pricing mechanism.
As is well known, targeting an inflation rate of zero is welfare optimizing in that setting. At
the ZLB, it is optimal to commit to target a higher rate of inflation for some time once the ZLB
is no longer binding. But as shown by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), optimal policy under
forward guidance is prone to a problem of dynamic inconsistency. Recently, price level targeting
has been suggested as a strategy to overcome this problem: under price level targeting, periods
of undershooting the target are automatically followed by catching up periods of higher inflation
in order to return to target, introducing an automatic stabilization mechanism.1
Our paper analyses price–level targeting in a traceable three–period setup. Extending the
framework of Benigno (2009), we characterize monetary and fiscal forward–guidance policy in a
model, in which price–level targeting emerges endogenously as welfare–optimal policy through
the welfare function. To this end, we deviate from the Calvo assumption and assume that firms
are ex–ante heterogeneous: a share of firms exhibit long–run price stickiness over the whole
model horizon. Nevertheless, in such a regime, similar issues arise as under inflation targeting:
it is optimal to commit to a higher price level for some time once the ZLB will no longer
be binding. However, unlike inflation targeting, a price–level target constrains the credible
amount of overshooting through deflationary expectations when returning to target. So it may
be optimal to commit to holding nominal rates at zero for an extended period even after the
shock has abated. Again, optimal policy is not time consistent.
Under discretion, price–level targeting works indeed as automatic stabilization mechanism
in the sense that it alleviates the ”paradox of flexibility”. Under inflation targeting, more
flexible prices amplify contemporaneous deflation for a given contractionary shock. As shown
in Werning (2012), discretionary welfare loss is lowest with completely rigid prices. In contrast,
price–level targeting mitigates output shortfalls, during a deflationary liquidity trap, by raising
inflationary expectations under discretion. In this regime, stronger contemporaneous deflation,
due to more flexible prices, further increases inflationary expectations as long as long–run price
expectations remain anchored. This decreases the real rate and stimulates consumption. We
show that discretionary welfare loss is lowest with fully flexible prices. However, the effect of
price rigidities on welfare may be non-monotonic: for large enough price stickiness, relaxing
price stickiness marginally, may lead to higher welfare losses.
Characterizing optimal commitment policy, successful forward guidance depends on the cred-
ibility of ”irresponsible” monetary easing (Krugman, 1998). We show that under price–level
targeting a new constraint emerges that may restrain optimal commitment. Similar to inflation
1For a recent survey see Hatcher and Minford (2014).
2
targeting, it is optimal to commit to excess inflation. However, we show that under price–level
targeting, the credible amount of future overshooting that the central bank can announce, is
constrained by the ZLB even after the shock has abated. The reason is straightforward: periods
of overshooting need to be followed by deflation to return to target. The stronger the overshoot-
ing, the larger the degree of deflation required later, driving the nominal policy rate possibly
again to the ZLB. So the central bank may find it optimal to hold the nominal rate at zero for
an extended period while postponing the return to the price level–target.
Recently, Cochrane (2013) argued that –due to nominal indeterminacy under inflation targeting–
the New Keynesian framework exhibits multiple equilibria with different price paths, some of
them with mild inflation and no output loss during a liquidity trap. We characterize the opti-
mal price path under price–level targeting and show that price stickiness eliminates price–level
indeterminacy under optimal policy.
Finally, we introduce government spending as additional policy tool. We show that, simi-
lar to inflation targeting, with price–level targeting, a countercyclical impact reaction of fiscal
spending is optimal, both under discretion and commitment. When policy rates are zero for an
extended period of time, government spending should become more front–loaded. However, since
fiscal spending affects nominal rates through marginal utility, the credibility of an announced
government spending path might be constrained by the ZLB even after the adverse shock fully
abated. Finally, we show that procyclical fiscal policy always results in welfare losses that are
even higher than under discretionary policy.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines our model. Section 3
analyzes discretionary monetary policy and the role of price rigidities on welfare losses. Section
4 derives the optimal forward guidance paths. Section 5 introduces fiscal spending into our
model and Section 6 concludes.
2 Baseline Model
We consider a discrete time, three-period setup with t ∈ [1, 2, 3]. The households’ optimization



























P1C1 +B1 = W1N1 + T1
P2C2 +B2 = W2N2 + (1 + i
S
1 )B1 + T2
P3C3 = W3N3 + (1 + i
S
2 )B2 + T3
where ρj is the stochastic discount rate, σ is the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution, ϕ
characterizes the elasticity of labor supply, Ct is real consumption, Nt are hours worked and
Pt is the price level. Households save via the purchase of short-term (one period) nominal
bonds, Bt, which yield interest i
S
t . Wt is the nominal wage rate and Tt are nominal lump–sum
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net transfers including firms’ profits and lump–sum taxes. It is straightforward to derive the
log-linear aggregate-demand curves through the Euler equation and market clearing condition:
yt − y
⋆ = Et[yt+1 − y
⋆]− σ
(
iSt − [E[pt+1]− pt]− ρt
)
, t ∈ {1, 2} (2.1)
where yt ≡ log Yt, pt ≡ logPt and y
⋆ denoting the efficient (log–)level of production.
Firms have mass one. Imposing the standard Calvo (1983) assumption induces inflation
targeting as welfare–optimal policy. To see this, consider a Calvo mechanism in our three-period
setup. Without loss of generality, assume that in period 0 the economy is in steady state and price
dispersion is zero, such that the aggregate price level p0 equals the idiosyncratically optimal price





Let Γ ∈ (0, 1) denote the Calvo probability that a firm is able to just prices. Then, coming from





bank, which can control aggregate demand perfectly, is concerned with welfare–detrimental
idiosyncratic price dispersion resulting in inefficient labor allocation. In period 2 the central
bank’s problem therefore is to minimize price dispersion by setting p⋆2 optimally. Given the Calvo
assumption, in period 2 the mass of firms charging p⋆0 isM0 = (1−Γ)
2, the mass of firms charging
p⋆1 is M1 = Γ(1−Γ) and the mass of firms that will be charging p
⋆
2 is M2 = Γ
2 + (1−Γ)Γ = Γ.












2. Minimizing D2 by choosing
p⋆2 implies p
⋆
2 = p1 and given the Calvo inflation process it follows that p2 = p1, such that π2 = 0.
It is straightforward to apply this argument to any period t. Therefore, with Calvo mechanism,
minimizing idiosyncratic price dispersion induces an aggregate inflation target of zero.
The intuition for this result is as follows: with Calvo–pricing firms are homogeneous ex–ante
(before it is exogenously determined which firms can adjust prices). Therefore, in response to
an exogenous shock, all firms want to adjust to the same new optimal price. In that sense, the
adjusting firms are representative for idiosyncratic optimal behavior of all firms. Consequently,
with Calvo–pricing, inflation is a perfect signal of idiosyncratic price distortions, because inflation
only occurs if the adjusting firms find a new price level optimal.2 But as the non–adjusting firms
find the same price level optimal, it necessarily follows that these firm cannot behave optimally
and price distortions emerge. Therefore, with Calvo–pricing, targeting a zero rate of inflation
emerges as the natural strategy for a central bank that is concerned with minimizing price
distortions.
To modify the framework such that price–level targeting emerges endogenously as welfare–
optimal policy, we do not impose a Calvo mechanism, but allow firms to be ex–ante hetero-
geneous. In particular, a share α1 exhibits long–run price stickiness and a share α2 exhibits
short–run price stickiness. Assume that in the past (call it period 0), the economy has been in
steady state such that all firms charged the same price p⋆. α1–type firms have long–run sticky
prices in the sense that they cannot deviate from p⋆ in periods 1, 2 and, with probability λ, also
not in period 3. The parameter λ allows us to vary the degree of long–run rigidity in period
3 independent of rigidities in the other periods. A share α2 of firms exhibits short–run price
stickiness, because they cannot deviate from p⋆ only in period 1, but can adjust freely from
2Only with perfectly flexible prices, inflation is no signal for price distortions.
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then on. The remaining 1 − (α1 + α2) firms can adjust their prices freely also in period 1. In
contrast to Calvo pricing, where both short–run and long–run stickiness are controlled by the
Calvo–parameter only, this pricing scheme allows us to elaborate on the (potentially asymmetric)
effects of short–run and long–run price stickiness on optimal monetary policy commitment.3
Firms’ production technology is homogeneous and given by Yt(i) = ANt(i), ∀i ∈ [0, 1],
where A is a productivity constant. The good market is monopolistic competitive such that
Yt(i) = (Pt(i)/Pt)
−θYt with θ being the elasticity of substitution between a continuum of goods.
Given our pricing scheme aggregate (log-) supply can be derived as
pt − p
⋆ = κt[yt − y
















+ ϕ). Since limα1→0 κ2 =
limα1→0 κ3 = +∞ but limα1→0 κ1 6= +∞ there will be no output gaps in period 2 and 3 if
long–run price rigidity is zero. In period 1, however, an output gap emerges independently of
α1 since also the α2–type firms have their period 1 prices set to p
⋆ (short–term price rigidity).
By construction, once some new firms are allowed to optimize freely under our pricing scheme
(α2 in period 2, (1 − λ)α1 in period 3), they know that they are free to adjust from then on
for all remaining periods. Therefore, unlike with a Calvo mechanism, when optimizing, firms
do not need to internalize that they may not be allowed to re–optimize in the future. Thus, the
aggregate supply curve is determined by the nominal anchor p⋆, from which some firms will never
deviate. Thus, if yt deviates from its equilibrium level, firms that can adjust prices freely will
opt for a different price than p⋆, inducing welfare losses through inefficient labor allocation. So a
price–level target of p⋆ emerges endogenously as welfare–optimal policy in the welfare function.






























Monetary policy is characterized by the announcement of price path {pt}
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t=1 to forward
guide expectations. The central bank’s objective is to minimize the quadratic loss function
subject to the aggregate demand curves, Equation (2.1) and aggregate supply curves, Equation
(2.2). According to Equation (2.3) the central bank would like to close the price gap pt − p
⋆
in every period. This can always be implemented if monetary policy is contemporaneously not
constrained by the ZLB, i.e. if the nominal rate iSt that induces pt − p
⋆ = 0, is positive. This
incentive holds irrespectively of any history {0, 1, . . . , t − 1} since Equations (2.1) and (2.2)
only include contemporaneous and forward–looking variables. This gives rise to a dynamic
inconsistency problem.
For the simulation exercises in Section 4 and 5 we choose a standard calibration with A =
1, β = 0.99, σ = ϕ = 1 and θ = 5 (= 25%markup). We choose α2 to be small to allow for
high α1 when α1 → 1 − α2: α2 = 0.1.
4 For the baseline calibration, we choose α1 = 0.25,
3Using a three–period model keeps this price scheme analytically traceable, as it limits the accumulation of
price dispersion over time.
4The calibration of α2 ∈ [0, 1− α1] has no qualitative effects on our results.
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such that in period 1 35% of firms cannot adjust their prices. We set λ = 1. The effects of
different calibrations of α1 and λ will be discussed in the following sections. When introducing
government spending, we assume that in efficient equilibrium G⋆/Y ⋆ = 0.2 and the inverse
intertemporal elasticity of substitution of government spending ηg = 1.
3 Discretionary Policy
To provide the simplest framework for our liquidity trap analysis, we consider the following
thought experiment: before period 1 the economy is in its steady state with price at target and
output gap closed. The central bank is expected to keep prices at target also in the future:
E0[pt] = p
⋆, t ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Following Eggertsson (2006) we assume that in period 1 a negative
time preference shock, ρ1, with ρ1 < 0 < ρ̄ = ρ2, hits the economy and drives it to the zero lower
bound. To keep the exercise traceable, we assume that there is no persistence in the shock, such
that, without any policy responses, the economy will revert back to steady state in period 2.
Thus, in our setup the ZLB will be binding for one period only. Solely by cutting the interest rate
down to zero, the central bank cannot prevent a recession in period 1, since this would require
a negative nominal rate. It can, however, announce to raise the price levels in the following
periods above target p⋆ to lower the current real rate of interest and thus to stimulate current
consumption even when the nominal policy rate remains stuck at zero. To perfectly stabilize
the economy in the first period the central bank would need to credibly announce a price level
of p̄2 = p
⋆ + |ρ1| for period 2. Such a policy, however, will never be optimal commitment
strategy: raising p2 above p
⋆ causes inefficiencies and thus welfare loss next period. The optimal
commitment strategy is to promise to raise p2 only so much that the marginal loss in period
2 (from accepting a price p2 > p
⋆) will be just equal to the marginal gains in period 1 (from
preventing p1 to fall too far below p
⋆).
Before we turn to the derivation of the optimal commitment strategy, we first establish
a result under discretion that is in stark contrast to a standard inflation–targeting regime.
Werning (2012) shows in his Proposition 2 for a continuous time model with inflation targeting
that welfare losses under discretion are lowest when prices are fully rigid (see also Eggertsson
and Krugman, 2012). Although this results may seem counter–intuitive as price rigidity is a
friction, it is an intrinsic feature of inflation targeting. Assume that a contractionary shock
drives the economy on impact to the ZLB and it is known to remain there for one period
only. The shock depresses output and thus deflation emerges. Given that inflation expectations
are well anchored at inflation target π⋆ ≥ 0, the real rate is given according to the Fisher
equation by r = −Eπ = −π⋆. Therefore, the real rate is affected neither by the strength of
contemporaneous deflation nor the degree of price stickiness. If price rigidity is increased, on–
impact deflation is mitigated, as prices can respond less to the shock, while output is further
depressed through price-induced, demand effects. Werning (2012) proves that the welfare–
improving effect dominates, such that discretionary welfare losses are lower, the more rigid
prices are.5
5We assume the ZLB to be binding for one period only. But the result remains unaffected if it is binding
for multiple periods. However, in that case the slope of the AD–curve is key: under inflation targeting, the
economy jumps to the upward sloping part of the AD–curve, whereas under price–level targeting it remains at
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In contrast, price–level targeting features an automatic stabilization mechanism through the
real rate, as inflation expectations are not constant under anchored price–level expectations.
Under discretion the central bank implements Pt = P
⋆ once the ZLB stops binding. Therefore,
the stronger the deflation (undershooting) during the liquidity trap period, the higher is the
rationally anticipated inflation that leads the economy back to target. This reduces the real
interest rate and hence output shortfalls. Consequently, the lower price stickiness, the stronger is
deflation induced by the adverse ZLB-shock. While this creates additional welfare losses through
price deviations, output deviations are reduced. For the limiting cases of perfect flexibility and
perfect stickiness, the positive output effect dominates the negative price effect, because – as
under inflation targeting– the weight on price deviations approaches zero for fully flexible prices
(see Equation (2.3)).6 Discretionary price and output gap are given by (yD1 −y
⋆) = σ1+κ1σρ1 and
(pD1 −p









Let α = α1 + α2 be the fraction of sticky prices in period 1. Since limα→0 κ1 → ∞ and
limα→1 κ1 → 0 it follows that
lim
α→0







Consequently, the paradox of flexibility does not emerge under price–level targeting. Even under
discretion, undershooting the price–level target credibly triggers higher inflation expectation,
such that welfare losses due to deflation are attenuated by a reduction in the real interest rate
(see also Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003).
Interestingly, for certain parameter calibration, the effect of price rigidity on aggregate
welfare is non–monotonic. As shown in Figure 1, the maximum welfare loss is reached at
ᾱ = 1+σϕ2(1−σ
θ
)+σφ . The location of that turning point is determined by the intratemporal elasticity
of substitution, θ relative to intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σ. The higher the degree
of inter-firm competition the more left–skewed becomes the welfare–loss function. ᾱ move to-
wards zero in the unit interval, i.e. a lower degree of price rigidity induces the maximum welfare
loss, while welfare loss at the limiting cases remains unaffected by α, as shown in Equation
(3.1). The intuition is the following: Equation (2.3) shows that higher competition increases
the welfare–weight of price deviations and therefore, ceteris paribus, discretionary welfare loss.
If firm competition is strong, i.e. intra-temporal elasticity of substitution is high, the effect of
price dispersion on demand for goods is strong. The same price differential induces a stronger
demand shift towards cheaper goods. Consequently, for constant degree of price rigidity, produc-
tion choice and labor allocation become stronger distorted and aggregate welfare decreases. For
ᾱ < 1 ⇔ 2σ < θ, i.e. inter–firm competition is strong enough, aggregate welfare loss increases in
α for α ≤ ᾱ but decreases for α > ᾱ. The intuition behind this non–monotonicity is as follows:
1. An increase in price rigidity, α, makes the AS–curve flatter increasing output volatility for
given price deviations pD1 − p
⋆. This induces higher welfare losses.
the downward sloping part. In the first case, inflation and output gap are positively correlated, while in the
second case the correlation is negative. Therefore, our results can be extended to the multi-period case, since on
a downward sloping AD–curve deflation reduces output shortfall. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for
pointing this out to us.
6Under inflation targeting and Calvo–pricing, the positive effect of price rigidity dominates its negative effect
through higher welfare weights. This is shown in Werning (2012), proposition 2.
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2. In contrast, an increase in α reduces price volatility, which improves welfare.
3. However, an increase in α also raises the weight, θ/κ1, of price deviations in the welfare
loss function (see Equation (2.3)).7
For α ∈ [0, σ/(1 + σ)] the third effect dominates the second effect since the increase of the
welfare weight is initially stronger in α than the reduction in price volatility. Therefore, for α
low enough, the first and the aggregate effect of 2. and 3. work into the same direction and
welfare losses rise in α. However, the second effect is more convex than the third effect and thus
the more α increases the stronger becomes the former relative to the latter (at α = σ/(1 + σ)
both effects are equal). For α > σ/(1+σ) the aggregate welfare effect of 2. and 3. turns positive,
attenuating the negative effect of higher output volatility. Since for further increases in α the
aggregate positive effect (2. + 3.) on welfare is more convex than the negative effect (1.) the
former effect gradually catches up and at α = ᾱ the total effect of price rigidity on welfare starts
turning positive.
Therefore, while the picture for the two extreme cases (α = 0 ∧ α = 1) is clear–cut, the
marginal effect of price rigidity on welfare depends on ᾱ. Only for ᾱ ≥ 1 a marginal decrease in
price rigidity is always welfare–improving in our model.













7Note that the weight on output deviations is normalized to unity.
8
4 Optimal commitment policy
It is well understood that to obtain optimal stabilization, the announced price path needs to be
credible. Forward guidance suffers from a dynamic inconsistency problem (Barro and Gordon,
1983): if the ex–ante announcement of the future price–level path is successful in mitigating
the ZLB, ex–post the central bank has no incentive to stick to its promises but rather wants
to return to the price level target to minimize contemporaneous and future welfare losses.8 To
analyze optimal commitment policy, we assume that central bank announcements are perfectly
credible according to the following assumption:




t+i, i ∈ N
This assumption is no purely theoretical concept. Figure 2 provides suggestive evidence for
credible commitment of the US Fed, that engaged early into explicit forward guidance. The
solid line indicates the effective policy rate for the US as estimated by Wu and Xia (2014),
adjusting the actual rate for unconventional policy measures. The vertical line indicates March
2009, the first time the Fed announced ”exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for
an extended period.” While other unconventional measures have also contributed to driving the
effective policy rate further down, the Fed’s forward guiding announcements since early 2009
have been a key factor (Campell, Evans, Fisher, Justiniano, Calomiris, and Woodford, 2012).
Therefore, provided a central bank has sufficient credibility, forward guidance –combined with
other unconventional policy measures– can contribute successfully to mitigating the problem of
the ZLB successfully.












8 effective policy rate
Notes: The time series for the effective policy rate is taken from Wu and Xia (2014). The vertical line indicates
March 2009, the first time when the Fed announced ”exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an
extended period.”
To derive the optimal price path under forward guidance, from now on we assume that
forward guidance is fully credible according to Assumption 1. The central bank is assumed
8For a discussion of dynamic inconsistency problem in forward guidance see for example Woodford (2003).
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to be able to guide the aggregate price level perfectly through announcements.9 To solve for
optimal policy in a liquidity trap we minimize Equation (2.3) s.t. Equations (2.1) and (2.2),
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The first equation of (4.1) requires optimal policy to equalize marginal welfare losses across time.
Thereby, monetary policy is constrained by the remaining equations. Since the ZLB is binding
in period 1, i.e. iS1 = 0, there will be positive co–movement between p1 and p2, as a higher p2
increases inflation between these periods and thus lowers the real rate which stimulates demand
in period 1. This is shown in the second equation of (4.1). The short–term nominal rate between
periods 2 and 3, iS2 , is not necessarily zero as shown in the third equation of (4.1).
The optimal commitment under a price–level–targeting regime follows the intuition for in-
flation targeting (see Krugman, 1998) closely. In period 1, a discount factor shock disturbs the
economy, driving the natural rate below zero. With the ZLB restricting the short–term policy
rate, a recession is triggered. While under discretion the economy reverts back to steady state
in period 2, optimal policy dampens period 1 recession by promising overshooting (excess in-
flation) in period 2, forcing the real rate of interest in period 2 below its natural level rn2 = ρ̄.
In contrast to inflation targeting, where the economy never returns to the old price path after
the ZLB ceases binding, under price–level targeting and price stickiness the central bank tries
to return to p⋆ in period 3. This requires deflation between period 2 and 3. To be able to
orchestrate a boom in period 2, the real rate must be lowered below its natural level, despite
these deflationary expectations. Since agents have rational expectations, the real rate of interest
is determined by the Fisher equation. Thus, under credible price–level guidance the nominal
rate has to adjust consistently to the announced price path to satisfy the Fisher equation and to
implement the required real rate. This imposes a crucial constraint on credible forward guidance
with a price–level–targeting regime: the central bank cannot promise to implement arbitrarily
high deflation between periods 2 and 3 as this can require a negative nominal interest rate. This
can be seen when rearranging the third equation of (4.1):







ρ̄ ≡ B ≤ 0 , (4.2)
i.e. the maximum deviation of p3 from p2 is constraint below, depending on the AS–curve slopes
and the price path announced for period 2. This restriction does not appear with inflation
targeting, as excess inflation is not necessarily succeeded by deflation. In this respect, while




and p3 = α1λp




credible price–level targeting attenuates adverse welfare effects under discretion, relative to
inflation targeting, it can limit central banks’ leeway to additional dampen deflation through
forward guidance. For arbitrary p2 − p
⋆ > 0 it holds that ∂B/∂α2 = 0 and ∂B/∂α1 > 0, i.e.
the constraint on optimal forward guidance is solely dependent on long–run price rigidity and
becomes more likely to bind, the more rigid prices are in the long run. To analyze how this
constraint affects forward guidance policy, let us first assume that the shock in period 1, ρ1, is
weak enough such that the ZLB will not be binding in period 2.
Assumption 2a. The discount factor shock ρ1 is small enough such that under optimal policy
the ZLB is not binding on iS2 .
Under Assumption 2a and for p3 = p
⋆ we can solve (4.1) for optimal policy analytically.10 As
long as the ZLB is not binding in period 2 the optimal price target in period 3 is p3 = p
⋆ for the
following reason: as long as optimal policy is able to dampen the recession via excess inflation
in period 2 only, there is no need to deviate in period 3 from the target p⋆. Any deviation
in t = 3 would simply lead to an offsetting adjustment in the unconstrained nominal rate iS2
according to the third equation in (4.1). Price deviations in t = 3 can therefore not induce any
real effects and would only lead additional welfare losses due to price distortions. Therefore,
unconstrained optimal forward guidance implements p3 = p
⋆. Figure 3 shows the optimal
policy paths compared to the discretionary solution given the baseline parameter calibration
and ρ1 = −0.01.













Figure 3: Optimal vs Discretion Policy
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Notes: Unconstrained commitment solution for baseline calibration and ρ1 = −0.01 to ensure that the ZLB is
not binding for iS2 .
Optimal policy orchestrates a boom in period 2, which, additionally to the effects on inflation
expectations, helps mitigating adverse ZLB effects through a reduction in expected marginal
utility of consumption in t = 2. This results is also documented for a inflation–targeting regime
by Werning (2012). With p3 = p
⋆ but p2 > p
⋆ optimal unconstrained policy triggers deflationary
expectations between periods 2 and 3. If the discount factor shock is large enough, optimal policy
might be constraint be the ZLB even after the shock has fully abated, as shown in Figure 4 for
ρ1 = −0.02 and different degrees of long–run price stickiness.
The lower the degree of price stickiness, the higher the overshooting the central bank aims to
implement in period 2. The transmission mechanism is straightforward: the lower the degree of
price stickiness, i.e. the smaller the fraction of firms that fixed their prices at p⋆, the lower the
weight of price deviations on welfare losses for t = 2, 3.11 Therefore, price deviations from the
target become less costly and monetary policy less eager to hit the target. However, as discussed
above, not any overshooting can be credibly announced. As shown in the third panel of Figure 4,
if long–run price rigidity is relatively low, policy would like to orchestrate a strong overshooting
in period 2 as missing the target is less expansive in terms of welfare. But the thereby induced
deflationary expectations from period 2 to 3 are strong enough to drive the nominal interest
rate into negative territory. Thus, the announcement of theses price paths cannot be credible,









Figure 4: Effect of α1 on optimal policy
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Notes: All parameters except α1 are kept at their baseline calibration and ρ1 = −0.02 to ensure that for α1 = 0.25
the ZLB is violated for iS2 .
Under optimal commitment, aggregate welfare losses decrease monotonically in the degree
of price stickiness. In particular, intertemporal losses approach zero if long–run price rigidity,
α1, goes to zero. Therefore, the result establish in Equation (3.1) also holds with unconstrained
forward guidance. With our pricing scheme, welfare losses, due to price deviations, occur because
some firms find it optimal not to deviate from p⋆. If the fraction of these firms approaches zero,
price deviations from target in period 2 become cheaper and in the limiting case monetary
policy can stabilize period 1 perfectly by raising p2 to p
⋆ + |ρ1|. However, with marginal long–
run price rigidity (α1 = ε), announcing this p2 is not credible, as the corresponding deflation
to p3 = p
⋆ drives the nominal rate in period 2 below the ZLB (third panel in Figure 4). Only
with perfectly flexible prices in period 3, α1 = 0, perfect stabilization is credible, as in that case
p3 is indetermined. With prices being perfectly flexible, there is no longer a nominal anchor
(dashed black lines in panels 2 and 3, Figure 4). In that case, the ZLB in period 2 is no longer a
binding constraint, as p3 can always be chosen such that i
S
2 ≥ 0. Therefore, the model features
a discontinuity at α1 = 0. This discontinuity is independent of the degree of short–run price
stickiness (α2).
We now consider the case that the ZLB is a binding constraint also for period 2.
Assumption 2b. The discount factor shock ρ1 is large enough and/or the degree of price stick-
iness is low such that under optimal policy the ZLB will be binding also in period 2, violating
Assumption 2a. In that case iS2 = 0
13
The severity of the shock drives nominal rates to zero and thus restricts monetary authorities
in implementing the optimal commitment price path. With the feasible amount of deflation
between periods 2 and 3 being limited, policy is now restricted to be third best, requiring
deviations from target also in period 3, p3 > p
⋆, to be able to credibly promise sufficient excess
inflation in period 2.
Using iS2 = 0 in (4.1) allows us to solve for constrained optimal policy analytically. Figure 5
shows optimal policy with the ZLB being binding in period 2 compared to unconstrained optimal
policy and the discretionary solution for ρ1 = −0.05. Under constrained optimal policy, forward
guidance can provide less stimulation in period 1. The maximum downward jump in the price
path from t = 2 to t = 3 is constrained by the ZLB on iS2 as the central bank cannot provide
enough nominal ease to make any larger drop credible to agents. The drop in the price level
required is so large that it drives iS2 far into negative territory. As agents anticipate that this is
not feasible, the announced price path is thus not credible and the monetary authority can only
implement the constrained best solution which induces higher aggregate welfare losses. Thus,
third best policy has to keep the short–run nominal rate at the ZLB even after the shock has
gone. Crucially, this is no direct consequence of the shock itself but of the optimal intertemporal
trade-off between raising p2 to attenuate the recession and the corresponding deflation between
period 2 and 3.12
12Whereas under unconstrained optimal policy the price path is decreasing between t = 2 and t = 3, this is not
necessarily the case for constrained forward guidance. If period 1 and period 2 prices are very rigid (α1 → 1−α2)
but period 3 prices are very flexible, constrained optimal policy can mostly affects period 1 price expectations via
period 3 announcements. The optimal price path is then increasing between periods 2 and 3.
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Figure 5: Optimal Policy and the ZLB in period 2
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Notes: Constrained optimal solution for baseline calibration and ρ1 = −0.05 to ensure that the ZLB is binding
for iS2 .
The fact that under constrained optimal policy the economy does not return to target is
driven by our three–period assumption. Extending our model to n periods, for n large enough
the ZLB will at some point cease being a binding constraint as the deflation required for returning
to target can be spread across sufficient periods. So, for large enough n, also constrained optimal
policy will bring the price level back to target. However, also in this case the ZLB will be a
binding constraint even after the shock has fully abated.
The effect of price stickiness on constrained optimal policy is similar to before. Again, the
lower the degree of price stickiness in the model, the more excess inflation will be triggered under
constrained forward guidance. For α1 = 0 the economy can be stabilized perfectly, without any
welfare losses occurring over time as in that case the welfare weight on price deviations from
period 2 on is zero. The higher α1 the less accommodative policy is and for α1 = 1 − α2
barely any excess inflation will be announced. But due to a very flat AS–curve even these small
deviations will be very costly as they imply strong output deviations.
On a more theoretical note, Cochrane (2013) recently argued that most results usually found
in New Keynesian models during a liquidity trap are artifacts of an arbitrary equilibrium choice.
To this end he introduces additional equilibria, identified by different steady state inflation
rates that persist once the ZLB stops binding. These equilibria feature price paths that deviate
arbitrarily from the old equilibrium path. Within our setup, it is straightforward to show
that this results does not appear under price–level targeting. To this end, we introduce the
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degree of period–3 price rigidity λ. For λ = 0 the price level in period 3 is perfectly flexible.
Potential deviations from target in period 3 can be stronger, the lower λ, as the welfare weight
of deviations approaches zero (limλ→0
θ
κ3
= 0). Consequently, monetary policy can announce
stronger overshooting for period 2, given that it is optimal to let p3 overshoot more strongly.
But even for λ close to zero no arbitrarily large price deviations in period 3 do occur as any
deviation from p⋆ is costly. Under price–level targeting, (constrained) optimal policy determines
p3 uniquely. The price level p3 will be indetermined only for λ = 0. Hence, with only marginal
price rigidities (constrained) optimal policy eliminates price level indeterminacy and thus does
not support arbitrary equilibrium choice.
5 Optimal Government Spending
Up to now, policy could only stimulate during a zero interest rate environment by forward
guiding expectations about the future price path. We now introduce government spending as
an additional commitment device and analyze optimal fiscal policy in interaction with monetary
policy and price level targeting. To this end, we follow Woodford (2011) and add additively
separable government consumption to the household’s utility function. LetGt denote the amount
of a public good provided by the state and let G⋆ denote the corresponding steady state level.
To keep this exercise as traceable as possible, we assume that government spending is financed
via a lump–sum transfers Tt and abstract from distortionary taxes.
13 Although stylized, this
setup allows us to take a stance on the cyclicality of optimal government spending in our discrete
time model.
To see how government spending works in our model it is illustrative to consider the modi-
fied (log-linear) aggregate demand curve, derived from the Euler equation and market clearing
condition Yt = Ct +Gt:
yt − y
⋆ = Et[yt+1 − y
⋆] + Et[gt − gt+1]− σ̃
[
iSt − ρt − Et[(pt+1 − p







and σ̃ ≡ σ(y⋆ − g⋆), g⋆ = log(G⋆). To stimulate period t production fiscal
policy has two instruments at hand: first, it can raise gt to induce a direct demand effect on
output and to make up for any private demand shortfall. Second, it can announce a decreasing
government spending path between period t and t+1 (gt−Etgt+1 > 0). This increases marginal
utility of consumption of households in period t relative to period t + 1, as agents anticipate
that future private consumption will be high due to less crowding–out. Hence, in addition to
the announcement of a price level path, the credible commitment to some optimal path for
government spending allows to attenuate the shock both directly and indirectly.
Given the time preference shock, it might seem optimal to cut government spending in the
initial period in the same way as consumers cut current spending –after all, the social planner
should internalize the time preference shock. With current real market rates being high, calling
for austerity measures might be seen as the optimal response. But realizing that shadow rates
are low, optimal policy will be characterized by intertemporal countercyclical spending shifts.
It will be optimal to shift the path of fiscal policy relative to the optimal first best path by
13For a setup with distortionary taxes see for example Eggertsson (2006).
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raising government spending (lowering taxes) in the first (the liquidity trap) period relative
to the second period (the period required to stimulate consumption by keeping the real rate
below the natural rate). It pays to aim at positive (negative) additional spending during the
period when the real rate is above (below) the natural rate, as long as the social planner realizes
that this helps to bring the market rate closer to the shadow (natural) rate. Since even under
commitment, it is never optimal for monetary policy to bring the real rate down to the natural
rate during the liquidity trap period, additional instruments can always improve upon pure
monetary policy. In that sense, macro ”trumps” public finance.
Let us derive analytically the optimal government spending path under Assumptions 1–2
and iS1 = 0 for the baseline calibration. Under full commitment over both, the future price and





































































and denoting the ηg inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution of the
public good. Equation (5.2) is derived from a second order approximation of the extended util-
ity function.14 Equations (5.3) and (5.4) represent the AS–AD equilibrium in periods 1 and 2,
respectively, derived from Equations (2.2) and (5.1). The solution to this optimization problem
is shown in Appendix A. Using these first–order–necessary conditions, one can derive the fol-
lowing relationship: g1 = Σ1[p1 − p
⋆], with Σ1 < 0 for any parameter calibration (see Equation
(A.1)). Therefore, independent of commitment and the ZLB, optimal fiscal policy reacts coun-
tercyclical on impact. Thus, government consumption, which, unlike private consumption, can
be perfectly adjusted by policy independently of the current market rate, is a tool to smooth
output fluctuations by leaning against the wind.
Unconstrained optimal policy features a countercyclical government spending path with all
variables returning to their equilibrium levels in t = 3 (see solid line in Figure 6). The increase
in government spending in period 1 makes up partially for the shortfall in private consumption
and the credible commitment to relatively lower government spending in the future induces
households to shift consumption again into period 1 via lower marginal utility in future periods.
However, as above, implementing the unconstrained commitment path is feasible only as long
as the nominal interest rate is non–negative in period 2. If, however, the adverse shock is large
enough the ZLB will again be binding also in t = 2. The reason can be seen in equation (5.4):
given the optimal price level path, mitigating the ZLB might require g2 − g3 to be positive, i.e.
procyclical fiscal spending in period 2 or deviations from g⋆ in t = 3. This cannot be optimal
and hence government spending will not eliminate the possibility of a binding ZLB in period 2
in the presence of large shocks. In this case monetary policy is again limited in its ability to
14The derivation is available from the authors upon request.
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credible promise overshooting for t = 2 (third panel in Figure 6), such that, as in Section 4, the
drop from p2 to p3 is limited under constrained optimal policy (dashed line in Figure 6).
Figure 6: Optimal vs Discretionary Policy
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Notes: Parameters at baseline calibration. For this simulation ρ1 = −0.05.
However, government spending can partially make up for the short–fall of monetary policy by
providing additional stimulus in the first period compared to the unconstrained solution. Note,
however, that under constrained forward guidance the indirect stimulative effect of government
spending, via low marginal utility of private consumption in the second period, is also constrained
by the ZLB in t = 2. Since, via Equation (5.4), ∂iS2 /∂(g2−g3) > 0 an upward sloping government
spending path between period 2 and 3 exhibits additional downward pressure on the nominal
interest rate. Thus, the credible amount of future austerity that can be promised in t = 1 is
limited and g3 has to deviate below g
⋆ to allow for enough countercyclical spending in t = 2.
In that sense, under constrained optimal policy the short–run direct effect of countercyclical
government spending is even more important. If the central bank keeps the policy rate at
the ZLB for an extended period of time even after the shock abated, this should optimally be
accompanied with stronger front–loaded countercyclical fiscal policy. Any short–fall in fiscal
stimulus, e.g. due to procyclical austerity measures, will impose welfare costs onto the economy
as we show below.
Let us finally turn to discretionary policies. We consider two different scenarios: first, we
assume that monetary policy cannot commit to future activities and government spending is
fully inactive (dotted line in Figure 6). Second, we assume that both monetary and fiscal
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cannot commit but that fiscal policy reacts optimally to the slump in period 1, for which no
commitment is needed (ragged line in Figure 6). Clearly, without any commitment possible and
hands of monetary policy being tied by the ZLB, fiscal policy can help to increase aggregate
demand to attenuate the recession. The demand effect of increasing government spending and
the deceasing government spending path offsets the slump partially even without any credible
promise to future excess inflation.
During the recent crisis there have been calls for austerity spending even when policy rates
are close to or at zero. To see the effects of such a policy we now analyze the case that the
fiscal government, just like the household, takes the real rate as given and adjusts consumption
accordingly, i.e. Gt = Ct ∀t ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Thus, with a high real rate at the ZLB, government con-
sumption will be shifted into the future inducing a procyclical spending path and austerity. We
assume that households and monetary policy are aware of this behavior and that monetary pol-
icy satisfies Assumption 1. In this case, forward guidance is again limited to the announcement
of the future price level path.
The dashed lines in Figure 7 show optimal forward guidance given passive government be-
havior. For illustration, we consider the case of a small shock so that the ZLB is not binding
in the second period.15 Government spending is now procyclical with high fiscal consumption
when the real rate is low and vice versa. This policy turns out to be worse in terms of welfare
than optimal unconstrained policy (solid line in Figure 7). The intuition is straightforward:
procyclical government spending with austerity in the recession period amplifies economic fluc-
tuations both through direct demand effects and via creating the incentive for households to
further postpone consumption until period 2 when marginal utility is high.
Remarkably, procyclical fiscal policy also fares worse than the discretionary solution with
active government spending in period 1 (ragged line in Figure 7). Since monetary policy inter-
nalizes the effects of its price level decisions onto government behavior, it is more reluctant to
trigger a boom in t = 2 as procyclical fiscal policy would amplify the output effects of excess
inflation. Despite lower inflation in t = 2 the real rate in period 1 drops sharply as output
and prices deteriorate under procyclical fiscal spending. This partially dampens the drop in
consumption and government spending. The recession in t = 1 remains, however, severe. This,
together with further fluctuations in periods 2 and 3, induces higher aggregate welfare losses
than under discretionary monetary and fiscal policy. In the latter case, losses in period 1 are
high, but no additional losses occur in later periods . It is important to note that this result
holds qualitatively independently of the calibration of ηu and ηg: it is independent of the weight
of output and government spending fluctuations in the welfare loss function.
15The results are similar for a binding ZLB in t = 2.
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Figure 7: Austerity policy
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Notes: Parameters at baseline calibration. For this simulation ρ1 = −0.01.
6 Conclusion
Most results –as well as paradoxes– established for optimal monetary and fiscal policy at the
ZLB, focus exclusively on the special case of Calvo pricing. This assumption induces inflation
targeting as welfare–optimizing monetary policy, which makes forward guidance especially prone
to the problem of dynamic inconsistency. We considered optimal policy under an alternative
pricing scheme, where firms are ex–ante not perfectly identical, and showed that price–level
targeting emerges endogenously as welfare–optimizing policy.
We establish four main results: First and in contrast to inflation targeting, under discretion
a lower degree of price rigidity is welfare improving, as stronger deflation increases inflationary
expectations. The paradox of flexibility, as identified by Werning (2012) and others, does not
appear if the central bank targets the price level directly instead of its growth rate.
Second, under commitment price–level–targeting introduces a credibility constraint on price–
path announcements, that does not appear under inflation targeting. Through the Fisher equa-
tion, the nominal interest rate must be set consistently with the announced price path. Optimal
policy needs to induce deflationary expectations between periods 2 and 3. Therefore, the mon-
etary authority faces a trade off between promising overshooting from period 1 to period 2 and
the deflation required to bring the price level back to target in period 3. Consequently, the
amount of excess inflation in period 2 may be constrained by the ZLB even after the shock has
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already faded away. This constraints the leeway of central bank forward guidance. Under infla-
tion targeting, periods of excess inflation are not necessarily succeeded by periods of deflation.
Therefore, the amount of credible excess inflation for period 2 is not limited above.
Third, we have shown that price stickiness eliminates price–level indeterminacy under opti-
mal policy. Thus, the equilibrium choice, once the discount factor shock abated and the ZLB
ceases binding, is not arbitrary but well defined. With a nominal anchor, optimal forward guid-
ance policy aims to bring the price level back to the target price level p⋆ in period 3. Therefore,
in our model the new equilibrium choice is not arbitrary, as under inflation targeting (Cochrane,
2013), but optimal.
Finally, we extended the model to allow for fiscal policy as commitment device. With the
ZLB being binding, the market real rate of interest is above the natural (shadow) rate in period 1.
So it is optimal to shift the path of fiscal policy relative to the optimal first best path by raising
government spending (lowering taxes) in the first relative to the second period. In contrast,
procyclical austerity policy induces even higher welfare losses than discretionary policy.
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A Optimal Government Spending: FOCs
Let µ and δ denote the Langrange parameters on constraint (5.3) and (5.4), respectively. Given




t=2 are perfectly credible according to
Assumption 1, we can drop expectation operators. The first order necessary conditions for the
optimization problem described by Equations (5.2)–(5.4) are given by
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. We can use the fourth
and sixth equation to solve for g1 and g3 directly:
g1 =
ηu(κ1 + σ̃)− κ
2
1Λ̃1
κ1(κ1 + σ̃)(ηg + ηu)− κ1ηu
[p1 − p
⋆] ≡ Σ1[p1 − p
⋆] (A.1)
g3 =
κ3Λ̃3 − ηu(κ3 + σ̃)
ηu − (κ3 + σ̃)(ηg + ηu)
[p3 − p
⋆] (A.2)
For any parameter calibration it holds that Σ1 < 0, i.e. independent of commitment and the
ZLB, optimal fiscal policy always reacts countercyclical in period 1. Eliminating Lagrange-
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(κ2 + σ̃)(ηg + ηu)
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[iS2 − ρ̄] , (A.6)
with Λ̃t ≡ Λt +
ηu
κ2t
, ∀t ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Equations (A.1)–(A.6) is a system of 6 equations for 8
unknowns. Using, iS1 = 0 (ZLB in period 1) and p3 = p
⋆ (ZLB not binding in t = 2) or iS2 = 0
(ZLB binding in t = 2), it can be solved for optimal policy.
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